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Abstract: Analogy is now an active field of research in psychology with many 
experimental results available and some theoretical work developed. Within the 
economics literature analogy has made little headway and there has been no attempt 
to empirically investigate the phenomenon. A new experiment is reported which 
investigates the role of analogy in picking a strategy in a matching game. It is found 
that analogy does exist and its effects are consistent with the use of current theories of 
choice in pure coordination games.  
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    Analogy has been little studied in the economics literature in spite of its 
acknowledged role in the reasoning process. However, in spite of increasing empirical 
research in the psychology literature and the increased interest in behavioural 
explanations in economics, little empirical work has been done on analogy as a 
reasoning process. This paper intends to make an initial contribution to the analogy 
literature by defining analogy within game theory and then testing to see what 
influence analogy has on the selection of equilibria in games. 
   Examples of analogical reasoning abound. One example is in the formation of 
stereotypes. When one meets someone from another country then one may make 
judgements about them based on what one knows about the characteristics of people 
from that country. One would make an analogy to extrapolate how one would behave 
when meeting such a person. Another use of analogy would be when making moral 
judgements. If, for example, one is wondering whether to give money to a beggar then 
one’s behaviour depends on one’s previous similar experiences. 
 Another area in which analogical reasoning may be useful would be when 
firms decide to start up a branch in another country. In a different country they would 
be faced with different business cultures and so may use analogies in order to inform 
their behaviour. Such an analogy could either be an analogy with the company’s own 
past behaviour in its home country or it could be an analogy with other companies’ 
current behaviour in the new country.  
   One thing to notice here is that these analogies are not always correct. In the 
case of firm behaviour, for example, making an analogy with one’s previous 
experience could be disastrously wrong. Likewise, copying the behaviour of the 
wrong firms could also result in an error. This implies that analogies do not 
necessarily act as “corrective” tools but only as a method of solving a problem 
whether it is done correctly or not. Another point is that analogies need not emerge 
from one’s own behaviour but could come from how other people behave in the same 
circumstances. Thirdly analogies can be created in a wide range of circumstances and 
form a very general class of reasoning. Finally, as shown in the last example, there are 
many potential economic applications of analogical reasoning. For this reason it is 
worth investigating further.  
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 1- Discussion of analogy in games and decisions 
 
   There has been limited discussion of analogical and similarity reasoning in the 
economics literature. Kreps (1990) discusses analogical reasoning informally when 
analysing how people interpret games which are not identical. Suppose, for example, 
that a game has the same strategies and number of players as a previous game but 
varies slightly in the payoffs while preserving ordinal payoff rankings. The game 
might very well be understood by looking at the similarities between the two games 
and so similar strategies may be played. In fact Kreps argues that this is precisely 
what people do when they are learning game theory. The solution used in one game is 
carried over to a similar but not identical game. Furthermore, as Kreps claims, it is 
certainly true that the use of subgames within game theory uses an analogy between 
the solution of a small game and that of a subgame to help with the solution of the 
whole of the larger game. 
     There is also the possibility that analogy may be invoked when choosing an 
equilibrium in a multiple equilibrium game. Such a possibility has been put forward 
informally by Sugden (2004) as a  means of deciding how to solve coordination 
games. This could be seen as a “benign” use of analogy. A more “malignant” use of 
analogy was suggested by Binmore (1999). According to Binmore, social conventions 
may be used by experimental subjects in order to interpret games in experiments. As a 
result of these conventions the subjects may not behave rationally and it requires a 
period of trial- and error learning to eliminate these biases. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that the reason that these social conventions are invoked by subjects is 
because the game seems  analogous to the situation in which the convention is usually 
applied.  
While there have been informal discussions of analogy such as these in the 
literature there have also been some more formal attempts to theorise about analogy 
and similarity. A theory of case based reasoning has been proposed by Gilboa and 
Schmeidler ( 1995). This theory builds up a theory of choice derived from revealed 
preferences constrained by axioms. A value function for an outcome in a particular 
case depends on a measure for the utility of the payoff multiplied by a measure for the 
similarity of the case to other previous cases in the agent’s memory. Choices are then 
made by maximising the value function This is a subjectivist theory of case- based 
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reasoning as there is no attempt to define whether there are objective similarities 
between actions in each case. Similarity is assumed to be a perceptual, subjective 
concept. A similar, although less detailed, account of a similarity relation and its 
relationship with preference is given by Rubinstein (1988). 
    Another theoretical investigation of similarity and analogy is that of Jehiel 
(2005). Jehiel’s aim is to investigate the ways in which analogy limits human 
reasoning within game theory. Nodes played by opponents in games are bundled into 
“analogy classes” from which an analogical expectation is derived from the average 
behaviour in those classes. From these expectations an equilibrium can be derived 
from the best replies to one’s analogical expectations of how one’s opponents are 
going to behave. One important point here is that in Jehiel’s  theory analogy classes 
are exogenously imposed so there is no determination inside the model  of how these 
analogy classes are formed. 
  This means that there is no theoretical guidance to experimenters as to how 
analogy should be tested in an economic experiment. It may be possible to test Gilboa 
and Schmeidler’s axioms in the same way that, for example Savage’s axioms have 
been tested. However, there is no guide in an objective sense as to what  object could 
be considered to be similar to another object. Jehiel’s theory is even worse in this 
respect in that his analogical classes are simply assumed. It follows that there is a 
need to demonstrate the existence of analogy within a game theoretic setting. 
This latter point is particularly crucial as it is not immediately obvious that all 
potential analogies can be used in a particular decision context. It may be the case that 
some analogies are not noticed or not used. It may be the case that the decision 
problem is too complex for analogical reasoning to be that effective. It is insufficient 
therefore to simply assume that analogies exist. One has to discover the conditions in 
which they can be used. 
  A further objection against these theoretical analyses of similarity and analogy is 
that, in fact, they only, strictly, deal with similarity. To take an example, in Jehiel’s 
theory, all the members of an analogy class must have the same numbers of actions. 
There is no means of varying the number of actions and still perceiving similarity. 
The Gilboa- Schmeidler theory has a similar limitation. However, this would seem to 
go against the whole idea of analogy which is to find partial similarity between the 
cases. It does not specify that the problems need be identical. There is certainly no 
need for the strategic framework (as opposed to the context) to be identical. Indeed 
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Kreps (1990) ideas on how people actually learn to solve games relies on a notion of 
analogy in which there is only partial correspondence between games. 
 
  
2- Discussion of analogy in psychology 
 
There has been a large amount of work done in recent years on analogy from 
both theoretical and experimental points of view  (See Gentner 2002 for an overview). 
Analogical mapping is the crucial part of the analogical mechanism which we shall be 
interested in this paper. An analogical mapping consists of matching a familiar 
situation or a base description with a less familiar situation or a target description. It 
requires a correspondence between elements of the two descriptions and then 
inferring how one should behave in the less familiar situation from how one behaved 
in the more familiar  situation. 
     The main theory of analogy in the psychological literature is Gentner’s 
structure- mapping theory (See Gentner 1983, 2001) where the aim is for subjects to 
find an alignment between elements of the base and target representations. This 
alignment has to have a one- to- one correspondence between some elements of the 
representations. Such an alignment binds the target and base representations together 
and can then be used to project further alignments from the base to the target. 
    Not everything between analogues can or should be aligned and it is a 
problem as to which elements are important in a particular analogy. There seem to be 
three factors involved; relevance to the goal of the problem being solved in the target 
situation; generality of the alignment between the base and target problems and the 
ease with which the base representation fits into the target representation. 
   One aspect of analogy which is of importance is that it has been shown to 
play a role in decision making (Markman & Moreau 2001). In fact analogy applies to 
many areas of decision making. Analogies can be used to frame a decision (as 
suggested by Binmore1999). They can also be used to deal with “affective 
uncertainty” where one is uncertain about the utility which can be derived from 
certain outcomes (See Cubitt et al. 2001). Analogy can also be used to form a 
comparison set of possible options by using a similar better known problem as an 
analogue. 
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    The final use of analogy in decision making is when subjects use problems as 
analogues when making a decision between options. In particular, decision makers 
will form an analogy between one decision problem and another and concentrate on 
those alternatives which hold for both analogues.  Subjects then transfer the method 
used to solve the base decision problem over to the target problem (Gick & Holyoak 
1983). This form is the type of analogy which will be studied in this paper. The other 
forms of analogy used in decision theory, such as that used to resolve affective 
uncertainty or to create an option set, will be assumed not to hold as all the options 
will be known and well- specified. There will also be controls over the framing of  a 
given problem so that it can only be framed in particular ways. 
   It follows that analogy could profitably applied to a decision theory context. 
Given a common goal in decision making (to maximise utility) between problems 
then an analogy might be expected to work by isolating the common set of 
alternatives between two analogues and then using the method of solution in the base 
problem to solve the target problem.  
 
3- A Definition of Analogy within game theory 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, analogy has been discussed in game 
theory both within a formal and an informal framework. However, in all cases, there 
has been little attempt to seriously study analogy in the manner outlined by 
psychologists. A game, in the psychological view, should be seen as a problem which 
needs to be solved by the participants. An analogy, on this viewpoint, would be a 
partial mapping between one game and another so that the strategy used to find an 
equilibrium in one game would also be used to find an equilibrium in the second 
game. This differs considerably from the ideas of analogy put forward by Jehiel or 
Gilboa and Schmeidler where analogy is simply a symptom of bounded rationality 
and so acts as a constraint on the subjects rationality. 
Analogy is seen here as an attempt by the subject to learn. However, it should 
be realised that this does not mean that current theories of learning in economics can 
be applied to the games. Learning theories rely on there being a full mapping between 
the structure and payoffs of the game so that the stage games are effectively identical 
to each other. Analogy, by contrast, relies on information transmitted as part of a 
partial mapping. 
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An example of analogy in game theory would be, for example, if a person 
played a stag- hunt game as if it was a prisoner’s dilemma and as a result continuously 
played the risk- dominant strategy. In this case the player would be using an analogy 
between the prisoner’s dilemma as the base game and the stag hunt as the target game 
in order to play the latter. In this case there is a partial mapping of some of the payoffs 
(or the ordering of some of the payoffs) in the prisoner’s dilemma to the stag game. 
Logically there are a variety of ways in which analogy could be used within 
game theory. Given that a game is composed of players, strategies, information sets 
and payoffs, in theory one could have a mapping between games which varied on any 
of these aspects. One could have, for example, a mapping between games which 
varied in payoffs but had the same game structure and number of players. Indeed one 
experiment which tests this has been done by Rankin et al. (2000)2  which is a variant 
on the comment made by Kreps (1990) outlined in the first section. 
 As was mentioned in the previous section, there have been a variety of 
psychological investigations of analogy in decision making (Markman & Morceau 
2001). It can be seen that each of the possible ways mentioned above (apart from the 
number of players) has been considered in the psychology literature. As we 
mentioned before, we will be ignoring the effects on payoffs and information sets (as 
well as players) and instead concentrate our analysis on strategies and framing.  
In this paper we will focus on analogy between games which have different 
numbers of strategies but the same number of players and identical payoffs. In 
particular we will be looking at normal form games which have two players and are 
symmetric both for the base and the target games. Symmetry is used here to 
encourage players to use analogies both from their past play but also from their 
opponent’s play. The payoffs remain the same for those strategies which are extant in 
both the base and target games. This is not to say that other results cannot be obtained 
through other restrictions but this one seemed one of the most intuitive ways of 
representing analogy. 
In order to tightly define an analogy we will use the notion of a substructure 
(Harsanyi and Selten 1993). Roughly, a substructure  is a game G’ which results from 
reducing the option set Φ of the game G to Φ’ by eliminating pure strategies3. It will 
                                                 
2 Rankin et al.’s experiment is strictly a limited test  in that the ordering of the payoffs is preserved.  
3 Note that it is assumed that we are looking at the agent normal form so it is assumed that agents and 
players are identical and there is no need to “fix” agents. 
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be assumed in this paper that the base game of an analogy is identical to the 
substructure of the target game. The analogy therefore is a full mapping between the 
base game and the substructure of the target game. This becomes a partial mapping by 
adding strategies to the option set in the target game. 
It may be objected that this is a peculiar definition of an analogy since it seems 
to eliminate a variety of other possibilities, in particular the possibility that the target 
game is a substructure of the base game. This is possible as analogy merely requires a 
partial mapping between the two and does not specify which should be the most 
complicated. However it could be argued that there is an informational asymmetry in 
that the base game is more easily solved if it is less complicated than the target game. 
It may then be argued that the aim of an analogy should be to make the finding of a 
solution in the target game comparatively more easy than it would otherwise be. 
There would be no point in using a complicated analogue to find the solution for an 
easy target game. This possibility should therefore be eliminated on pragmatic 
grounds. 
An analogy therefore will be defined in this paper as  a mapping between a 
base game and a substructure of the target game. Furthermore it will be assumed, for 
the sake of this paper, that the substructures are formed by eliminating symmetric 
strategies from the target game.  
 
Definition: An analogy in two player symmetric games is where there is a 
mapping Θ: L(G*) → L(G’) where L is a solution in game G* (the base game) and G’ 
(a substructure of G) given that G* and G’ are identical in structure, players and 
payoffs. 
 
The mapping Θ therefore takes any solution to the base game G* and transfers 
it over to the substructure G’ of game G where it acts as a solution to the game G. The 
function L denotes a generic solution to the games G* and G’ which need not be a 
Nash Equilibrium. 
The most plausible candidate for a solution based on analogy in game theory 
is Correlated Equilibrium (Aumann 1987). This is because Correlated Equilibrium is a 
method by which an external signal can be used by players in a game to create a self- 
enforcing equilibrium. This is done by the players either privately or publicly 
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observing a random event and then basing their choice of action on it. The contention 
here is that an analogy in the form of a correlated equilibrium from a base game is a 
method by which the players in the target game may be able to correlate their 
strategies and so find a solution for the latter. 
The question is: why should correlated equilibria be a better solution concept 
than any other for analogy? Why not use Nash Equilibrium? The answer to this is that 
if an analogy is available publicly (as is assumed in this paper4) then it is always 
available as a possible correlating device. This means that a correlated equilibrium is 
always possible in the presence of an analogy and so it should be modelled as such. 
It should be noted that this is simply a mechanism by which a simpler solution 
to a problem can be used to solve a more complex problem. This does not state how 
the correlated equilibrium in the base game was originally achieved but rather shows 
how this can be transferred to the target game. As an equilibrating device, analogy is 
incomplete but it does allow a step approach. The correlated equilibrium in the base 
game therefore may derive from some other source. 
This implies that any theory of analogy should be able to transfer a correlated 
equilibrium from the base game to the target game. It can easily be seen that a 
correlated equilibrium in a target game which has as supports the strategies in the 
substructure is also a correlated equilibrium in the substructure. If a base game is 
identical to this substructure then a correlated equilibrium in the base game is also a 
correlated equilibrium in the target game. 
To see this take the definition of a correlated equilibrium of a target game: 
 
∑∑
Ω∈
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Ω∈
− ≥
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where ω is a member of a partition of the set of states Ω (describing the outcome of a 
random event) and π is a probability measure over the ω in Ω. The subscript i∈ {1,2} 
refers to one of the two players. σi and τi are strategies which map the set Ω onto the 
set of actions.  A substructure simply restricts the number of strategies which can be 
used. Suppose that the set of states Ω is partitioned into two subsets:{ Ω* , Ω’} We 
can rewrite the above inequality as follows: 
                                                 
4 Naturally, if it was not available publicly then only subjective correlated equilibrium would be 
possible. 
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It can easily be seen that if the second term on each side of the inequality (i.e. 
where ω∈ Ω’) has zero probabilities (i.e. the supports of the correlated equilibrium 
are in the substructure) then these terms will be equal to zero. If the resulting 
inequality still holds then it would also be a correlated equilibrium of the target game. 
However if the second terms on each side are completely ignored (rather than the 
probabilities being set to zero) then this is also a correlated equilibrium of the 
substructure. This in turn would be a correlated equilibrium in the base game. 
     There are a wide number of possible analogies between games which could be 
studied in an experimental setting. However, there is an issue of control in trying to 
disentangle the effects of analogy from other factors (Payoffs, the structure of the 
game, uncertainty etc.) in some of the more complicated games. There may also be a 
problem in inducing a correlated equilibrium for the base game which can be 
transferred to the target game. This is particularly problematic as there has been little 
experimental research done on correlated equilibrium and correlative devices. It is not 
known with certainty which correlative devices would work to set up a correlated 
equilibrium in the base game. 
   For these reasons it was decided to focus on matching games when  
undertaking an experimental test of analogy. Matching games have a variety of 
advantages over other games in this respect. First of all the games are very simple and 
do not have many complications as regards payoffs or strategies. Secondly the role of 
non- strategic methods (i.e. salience)  to coordinate in matching games is well known 
in the theoretical and experimental literature (see Schelling 1960, Bacharach 1993, 
Sugden 1995, Janssen 2001, Casajus 2000). This gives a resource of theories to 
analyse the effects of  non- analogical choice in matching games as well as the effects 
of analogy. 
    Matching games also have some useful theoretical properties which mean that 
they are particularly well- suited to the experimental analysis of analogy. Matching 
games are symmetric and if symmetric strategies are eliminated then the resulting 
substructure is also a matching game. Furthermore, a correlated equilibrium of such a 
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substructure must be a convex combination of the Nash equilibrium strategies of that 
substructure. In addition any such substructure of  the matching game will be a 
formation of the target game (Harsanyi and Selten 1993). This means that the Nash 
Equilibria in the base game will also be Nash Equilibria in the target game. It follows 
that there are substantial rational reasons not to deviate from choosing an equilibrium 
in both the base and target games, although there may be ambiguity as to which one is 
chosen. 
 In effect the theories of coordination given above analyse how correlated 
strategies can be formed in matching games using salient characteristics as the 
correlative device. Furthermore these theories can accommodate analogy quite easily. 
Analogy simply becomes another form of salience. A strategy is chosen in a target 
game simply because it stands out as a result of it having being used before in a base 
game. In addition they also give theoretical reasons for choices in the base game and 
so allow prediction at each stage of the analogical process. 
   There are many extant theories of choice using salience although there has 
been little attempt to test to see which theory is the best for analysis5. In a way this is 
inevitable as the theories tend to have different foci from each other (see the contrast 
between Sugden’s and Bacharach’s theories). Furthermore these theories all intend to 
explain the same phenomena. A choice between theories of salience will, to a certain 
extent, be based on  convenience and, in the case of this paper, on the closeness to the 
theoretical concerns of the paper. For this reason the closest theory to this framework 
is that of Casajus (2000). 
 
4- Experimental design    
 
 The experiment has three purposes. First of all it is designed to test for the 
existence of analogy in matching games. Secondly the experiment is done in a manner 
which allows a comparative test between theories of salience and analogy. Finally, the 
experiment reflects the best practice in the psychological analogy literature while 
remaining loyal to the principles of game theory. 
 The experiment consisted of four treatments with one of the treatments being a 
“control”. Each treatment is constructed in the same way with two base games and a 
                                                 
5 This is not to say that there are no attempts at testing- see Bacharach and Bernasconi  (1997)for an 
example. However, this does not attempt to test against other theories. 
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final target game. This reflects the practice in psychological experiments of allowing 
two attempts for the subjects to “notice” the analogy before it had to be used in the 
target game (Gick & Holyoak 1983). This helps to overcome the “analogical paradox” 
(Dunbar 2001) whereby  it has been found that analogies are easy to use in natural 
settings but difficult in the experimental laboratory. The games were all matching 
games which used shapes to indicate strategies. An example of the target game can be 
seen in figure 1. This target game was answered by subjects in all four of the 
treatment groups. As can be seen the strategies are denoted by eight pairs of symbols. 
Most of these pairs are simply both squares. However three of them have one square 
and another symbol; a cross, a triangle or a circle. This allows for a comparison 
between saliencies over different treatments. 
   It will be useful to define the term “oddity”. An oddity is a symbol pair which 
stands out in some way from the other symbol pairs in the game being played. An 
example of this can be seen in the game in figure 1 where the cross symbol pair stands 
out from the other non- cross symbol pairs. Of course the circle symbol pair as well as 
the triangle symbol pair are also oddities. 
   The four treatments in the experiment are the circle treatment, the triangle 
treatment , the combined treatment and the control treatment. All of these treatments 
vary in the base games but are identical for the target game. Each base game had six 
symbols and were constructed to be substructures (and indeed formations) of the 
target game.  In the circle treatment the subjects were given base tasks each of which 
had one symbol pair out of six which had a circle. Examples of the two circle 
treatment base games are given in figure 2. The triangle treatment was similar to the 
circle treatment except that the base tasks had triangles as the oddity rather than 
circles. The combined treatment had base tasks where only four of the symbol pairs 
were both squares. The other two had a circle in one symbol pair and a triangle in the 
other.  
    While this will be analysed in more depth in the next section, it can be seen 
that the aim of the first two treatments is to induce an analogy between the first two 
tasks and the third task. The aim of this analogy is to encourage the subject to choose 
the relevant symbol such as the circle in the circle treatment and the triangle in the 
triangle treatment. The combined treatment is more complicated in that there is no 
unique analogy which can be transferred from the base tasks to the target task. The 
aim here is to see whether there is an attempt to transfer such an analogy across. 
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     The control treatment differs from the other three in that the base tasks do not 
aim to create an analogy with the target task. To facilitate this the base  tasks were 
given a set of symbols of which none were similar to those in the target class. 
Furthermore the symbols were different between the two base tasks thus disrupting 
any analogues formed as a result of repeating the base task. It may be the case that 
some symbols are privately salient to individuals who may use them to form 
analogies. However, these analogies will not be accessible to the rest of the people in 
the treatment so there will be no large scale effect as a result of this in the data.  
 
 
5.Analysis of analogy and salience in the experimental task
 
   The aim of the experimental design outlined above is twofold: first of all the task 
aims to isolate analogy as a phenomenon, controlling for a variety of confounding 
factors; second it aims to ground this within Casajus’ theory of salience to 
demonstrate that analogy has relevance to game theory.   In order to demonstrate that 
analogy is a genuine phenomenon a variety of factors have been taken into account in 
the experimental design:  
 
      i) The choices in the final task may simply be the result of the selected symbol 
pair being more salient than those symbols which are not “oddities” . This is 
controlled for by having three “oddities” in the last task. In this case the choices 
should be spread amongst them in equal proportions. 
  
  ii) The Choices in the final task may be the result of one oddity being more attractive 
than the other oddities. This is controlled for by having two “oddity” treatments which 
target different shapes. 
 
iii) The choices may be the result of “nuisance attributes” within the target game. This 
is controlled for by using the control group. While it is possible that there are nuisance 
attributes in the structure of the game, separate from the shapes used, these should 
also exist  in the control treatment. Any effect from analogy would therefore have to 
be significantly different from the control group.   
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  The main analysis of the results of this experiment will be derived from 
Casajus’ (2000) theory of salience.  Casajus  put forward a theory of salience which 
built on previous work by Bacharach (1993) and Janssen (2001). His basic idea was to 
focus on Harsanyi and Selten’s notion of Symmetry Invariance when applied to 
strategic form games. Symmetry invariance implies that any equilibrium in a game 
should not be affected by the labelling or order of the pure strategies. Furthermore, 
any two such pure strategies which have the same payoffs can be treated as  
symmetric and should be assigned equal probabilities. 
    Casajus extends this notion of symmetry invariance to framing in order to 
apply it to matching games. He defines a frame as a set of attributes from which  
labels can be applied to strategies. Examples of attributes could be “Shape” or 
“Colour” while the labels applied to strategies could be “Cube” and “Red” 
respectively. It is assumed that labels within frames are exhausting of all possible 
labels within their attributes and that attributes are exhausting of all possible 
attributes. This is done by placing any unknown labels or attributes into “default” 
labels or attributes. The frame defined in this way  is assumed to be the players’ 
characterisation of the game rather than that of the theorist. 
  A game which incorporates such frames is known as a Framed Strategic Form. 
A Framed Strategic Form (FSF) therefore is an extended game where an equilibrium 
is also an equilibrium of the underlying strategic game. However, the idea of the FSF 
is that this reduces the number of equilibria from the original game. Such an FSF 
should have the same solutions if the frames are translated into another language or 
some other isomorphic mapping is imposed on it. FSFs therefore are language 
invariant. This means that it is possible to relabel some of the strategies in a one- to 
one translation which will not affect the structure of the game. This will effectively 
reduce the number of symmetries in a matching game as an FSF’s labelling will not 
have as many symmetries as an unlabelled game.  
   In a similar way to Harsanyi and Selten, a notion of symmetry invariance is 
defined whereby the strategies are symmetry invariant as previously but there is also 
symmetry invariance between labels as well as a result of language invariance 
between labels in the same game. To take an example (Casajus 2001) if two people 
are playing a matching game and both are  faced with three pure strategies labelled by 
a red ball, a white ball and a white cube which should one choose? If colour is an 
attribute salient to both players then one would expect “red” to be chosen as the two 
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whites are symmetric. By contrast, if “shape” is salient then the cube would be chosen 
as the other two objects are symmetric in being balls. If, however, both colour and 
shape attributes are salient then one would choose the white ball. The reason for this 
is that the attributes “Shape” and “Colour” can be mutually translated because (in this 
limited universe) they only have two labels each and so are symmetric. Between these 
attributes the labels can be paired so that they exhaust the labels available within the 
problem. The best way of doing it within this example would be to pair “white” with 
“ball” and “red” with “cube”. Other ways of pairing will not pair all the labels. 
  However, on the next level, there is not a full symmetry between the red-cube 
label symmetry and the white- ball symmetry as there are more examples of the latter 
than the former. This means that the labels of “white cube” and “red ball” can be fully 
mutually translated using these symmetries but “white ball” cannot be fully mutually 
translated into either. Picking the white ball is the same as choosing the symmetric 
invariant equilibrium. 
             From this it would be interesting to ask how Casajus’ theory of salience 
would apply to the analogy experiment. The analogy would in this case operate as a 
method of identifying salient strategies. The strategy identified would be labelled as 
the analogue while the other strategies would be non- analogues As such these salient 
strategies would enter into the theory in much the same way as any other attribute. 
    However, this does not answer the question of what should be counted as an 
attribute within this particular experiment. As has been pointed out before (Bacharach 
& Bernasconi 1997), there is a perennial problem of “Nuisance Attributes”  emerging 
as a result of the structure of the game. While there have been attempts to solve these 
problems  it is unlikely that all such oddities can be eliminated. It follows that in the 
experiment there will be some “Nuisance Attributes”. However, it is unlikely that 
many of them will be noticeable to all of the subjects and so they will not be picked 
up in a significant way by the data. What is of interest is isolating attributes from the 
point of view of the goals of the experiment and the objective salience of those 
attributes. 
        It was decided that the attributes analysed would be those which are salient to 
the subjects and seem generalisable. This means that, in this experiment, any given 
player would be faced with just two attributes: 
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                  i) Within the target game there are the three oddities (the cross, circle and 
triangle). The labels would be “Oddity” or “Non- oddity”. These have been united 
together by the fact that they are all individually oddities but there is no objective way 
of distinguishing one as more salient as the others. 
 
                 ii) From the analogy there is a unique analogy . The labels would be (for 
example) “Circle” or “Non- circle” with labels varying according to the analogy. 
 
   This assumption of just two attributes may seem too radical. Why just these 
two attributes rather than the wide range of possible other attributes? To answer this, 
first of all note that all effects outside the base games or target game are excluded 
from the domain of the experiment. It is possible that these exist but they cannot be 
controlled for. At best we can assume that they are private to the individual. This 
assumption can be challenged but it is incumbent on the critic to show that these 
attributes exist and whether they are important.   However there are also the controls 
outlined above so if there is a “nuisance attribute” within the target game then this 
will be picked up by the control treatment. 
   We assume that just one analogue is picked out from the base games. This is 
because, for an analogy to work it must present a solution to the game. Two analogies 
will not do this so a rational player will just transfer one analogy across. Which 
analogy is transferred across will be established empirically. Whether a person has 
played a strategy in the base game will be taken as an indicator of whether they treat it 
as an analogy or not. Only when a strategy is played in the second base game and is 
also played in the target game will it then be considered as an analogue. The reason 
for picking a choice in the second base game as the crucial game is that this reflects 
the psychology literature where it is only the addition of a second task which fixes an 
analogy.  This will give a unique attribute for testing. In the case of the combined 
treatment where there are several possible analogues, this method allows us to pick up 
several  “types” of people according to their analogues. 
         Although there are many controls on this experiment it was decided that there 
is one, known, “nuisance attribute” which is too prominent to ignore. This is the 
“Topness” heuristic (e.g. Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997) where subjects tend to 
focus on symbols at the top of the page irrespective of their shape. While this is 
controlled for in terms of the target game alone, it may still emerge as an analogy 
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from the base games. Since it may usefully be used as an analogue (because it is quite 
“public” and easily noticed) it will be included in the analysis here. 
         The next question concerns what one should expect to see as the results of the 
experiment if the subjects are following Casajus’ theory of salience and the theoretical 
outline of analogy given above. For the “Circle” and “Triangle” treatments it should 
be fairly straightforward. First, one would expect that, given the simplicity of the  
base games, most would choose the circle and triangle respectively in each base 
game. This would then be used to form an analogy. Taking the “circle” treatment first,  
the analogy attribute would simply label the circle in the target game as the 
“analogue” and the other strategies as “non- analogues”. Since the Oddity analogue 
would already highlight the oddity symbols this means that the symbol pair with a 
circle will be doubly marked and so will be the unique oddity which would be 
selected. The same argument applies to the “Triangle” treatment. 
    Another possibility is that the “Topness” analogue may function instead. The 
analysis is rather more complicated in this case. Both of the topmost symbol pairs are 
selected out as analogues. The circle is selected out as the only oddity which is 
topmost while the squares are selected out as the only topmost square. The circle is 
most likely to be selected because the there are fewer symmetries between the circle 
and the other oddities compared to the topmost square and the other squares. 
     The Control treatment is straightforward. The only meaningful analogy to 
come through would be the “Topness” heuristic so this might mean that the two 
symbol pairs (and particularly the circle) at the top may be highlighted. However, it 
may be that this heuristic may not work (as it is a “nuisance” oddity not designed into 
the experiment) in which case only the Oddity attribute will hold and one would 
expect subjects’ choices to be equally divided between the three oddities. The 
Combined treatment is more complicated as there are potentially three different 
analogues which may come through from the base games: Topness, Circle and 
Triangle. It follows that each of these needs to be studied individually. The analysis 
for each of these is much the same as before given that analogues are assumed to be 
unique. 
    Until now we have referred to the analogies as coming from a player’s own 
previous play. This has been done in strict comparison with the single- player 
problems undertaken in the psychology literature. However, as was mentioned earlier, 
there is another source of information in the form of the other player. Since a player 
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has access to an opponent’s play because of feedback in the experiment it follows that 
they can learn from this. Since they are aiming to coordinate with the opponent and 
the game is symmetric then this forms a good source of analogical information. In this 
case the analogical reasoning  is more complex in that, instead of looking to see what 
worked in one’s own past performance and forming an analogy from that, one is 
looking at one opponent’s behaviour and  forming an analogy to one’s own behaviour 
in the target game. 
 
 
6  Results 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the raw data for the target game over all four treatments. 
The labels along the top give the position of the symbol- pairs. These can be 
understood by a comparison with figure 1 and the abbreviations are explained in 
footnote 6. Those which have “oddities” attached to them are given descriptive labels 
(e.g. “Triangle”). Down the right hand side are χ2 statistics comparing the 
distributions of the row with that of treatment 4. 
Table 1
 BL6 BR Cross Triangle TL Circle LU LLo χ2
1 0 2 1 2 2 27 0 0 26.8** 
2 0 0 4 21 4 3 0 0 29.9** 
3 0 0 6 6 6 11 2 0 10.5 
4 2 1 7 1 6 7 1 0 N/A 
** Indicates significance at 5% level 
 
Looking first at treatment 4 we can see  what is the “base state” without 
analogy. There does seem to be some clustering around the two “oddities” of the cross 
and the circle but there does not seem to be any clustering around the triangle. Instead 
there is some clustering around the top left square pair symbol, suggesting that the 
“Topness” heuristic has influenced some of the subjects. The lack of clustering on the 
“triangle” symbol is a mystery. Maybe the triangle was less distinguished from the 
squares than the properties of topness or being a circle or a cross. Even so, it is 
                                                 
6 Labelling: BL= Bottom Left; BR = Bottom Right; TL = Top Left; LU = Left Upper; LL = Left Lower 
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noticeable that the choices are not random and that there is some evidence of 
influence from focal points in the diagram. It may also be noted that here, as to a 
lesser extent in other treatments, there is some variation in the choices. This would 
reflect both the effects of error and also of “nuisance attributes” many of which will 
be private to the individual making the choices. 
Treatments 1 and 2 have similar outcomes in that the subjects choices cluster 
respectively round the circle and the triangle.. What deviation there is seems to go 
towards the oddities. A test against treatment 4  in both cases shows highly significant 
differences.  This suggests that there is a definite effect as a result of analogous 
reasoning. Furthermore, these differences can be seen to be definite effects as a result 
of having either circles or triangles as analogues beforehand. One additional effect 
which may be noted is that it seems that, as with treatment 4, the triangle is 
marginally less popular in treatment 2  than the circle in treatment 1. 
        Treatment 3 is more complicated. This treatment, as has been mentioned, does 
not have an obvious analogue. There are the two shapes, the circle and the triangle, 
while there is also the nuisance attribute of topness. A look at table 1 shows that there 
is a definite clustering of the choices around the “oddities”- including topness (which 
includes both “TL” and “Circle”. There is also evidence that some are preferred to 
others- circle for example has more choices than any other. However, one possible 
reason for this could be that the circle is at the top and may attract because of a 
topness heuristic. In addition, a non- analogue- the cross- attracted the same number 
of choices as the triangle and  “TL”. Furthermore when one looks at the χ2 statistic on 
the right then it can easily be seen that there is no significant difference between this 
and the control treatment. 
     At face value then, it may seem that Treatment 3 is the weakest of the three 
analogous treatments in that there is no obvious effect of analogy at all. Instead it may 
be the case that the subjects are simply influenced by the structure of the target game 
and simply ignored the base games. However this would be a premature conclusion as 
we have not examined what the subjects chose in the base games. This will indicate 
how much analogy was involved in this choice. 
      Tables 2 and 3 give the raw data for choices in the two base games. In each 
case the symbol pairs are labelled by position. Each oddity is also labelled in the cells 
in the table, either as circle or triangle depending on the treatment.  
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Table 2- second base game
 B7 LLo RLo T LU RU 
1 30 (C8) 0 0 3 0 0 
2 0 0 0 6 1 25 (T) 
3 8 (C) 1 0 13 1 9 (T) 
4 5 4 2 7 4 8 
 
 
Table 3- first base game
 B LLo RLo T LU RU 
1 0 1 29 (C) 3 1 0 
2 0 23 (T) 5 5 0 3 
3 1 0 4(C) 23 (T) 2 2 
4 4 9 0 13 0 4 
 
 
      Looking at Table 3 one can see that there is evidence that the oddities are 
being picked out in treatment 1 and 2, although again there seems to be the case that a 
marginally higher proportion of people chose circle than triangle. This might seem to 
be reversed in treatment 3 where there are both oddities. However, this is misleading 
as it can be seen that in treatment 3 the triangle oddity coincides with the “nuisance 
attribute” of topness.  According to Casajus’ theory  this would mean that the triangle 
in this case would become salient.  Looking at Treatment 4 we can see that there is 
indeed some clustering around certain symbol pairs and particularly around the top 
symbol pair. However, these symbol pair selections are not continued in the next base 
game or the target game so any clustering here is incidental and does not affect the 
analysis. 
    Looking at Table 2 and the second base game we can see a similar story for 
treatments 1 and 2 with the salience of circle and triangle dominating respectively. 
For treatment 3 we can see that the dominance of “triangle” in base game 1 has faded 
although “triangle” and indeed “circle”  still have a cluster of choices. Noticeably 
                                                 
7 Same labelling as before except that T=Top; B = Bottom 
8 C = Circle; T = Triangle 
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however the “topness” heuristic still seems to be operating and the largest cluster of 
choices is on the topness symbol pair. This suggests that the topness heuristic has 
already become an analogue.   Looking at treatment 4 one can see that the previous 
pattern in base game 1 has not been replicated so there is no sign of any analogy 
forming. It seems that most choices are either random or use private saliencies. 
 The issue then becomes that of how much the choices in the target game are 
influenced either by an analogy from one’s own play or by an analogy from one’s 
opponent’s play.  Table 4 shows, for each treatment, the proportions of subjects 
whose choices in the target game are similar to those in the second base game. It 
should be noted that this “similarity” covers both the oddities and the “Topness” 
heuristic. This has significance for the target game because the propensity to choose 
the circle symbol could be the result both of a circle analogy and a topness analogy. 
For this reason the circle symbol in the target game will be counted as being caused 
by an analogy for either depending on what the subject (or their opponents) chose in 
the second base game. 
 
       Table 4
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Self 79.4% 75% 37.5% 
Opponent 82.4% 62.5% 59.4% 
 
   Another point to note in connection with this table is that this is not making 
any claims as to whether the subject is being influenced by her opponent’s choices or 
her own. Indeed there could be a mix of influences and this experiment cannot 
separate them out. The comparatively high levels of repetition between base and 
target games whether from the player or the player’s opponent is suggestive that some 
kind of analogy is taking place whatever the source of the analogy. 
     It will be noticed that treatment 3 has the lowest prevalence of analogy, 
especially from a person’s own choices in the second base game. This should not be a 
surprise as there is a substantial possibility of confusion in this treatment. In fact only 
10 out of the 32 subjects in treatment 3 chose using the same heuristic consistently all 
through the three games. It is noticeable however that the opponent’s choices are used 
by the majority of subjects as analogues for how to choose in the target game. This 
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suggests that analogy is at work even in the complex environment of treatment 3 and 
that this is not purely the result of salience in the target game. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion
 
   This paper set out to demonstrate that the notion of analogy which has been 
widely tested within psychology could also be applied and tested in an experimental 
economics environment. Despite the fact that some economic theories have purported 
to use analogy it has been shown that these theories are limited in their scope and 
effectively assume the existence of analogical reasoning without investigating the 
conditions which result in its emergence. Instead it was shown that analogy can be 
analysed as a theory of learning based on partial mappings between analogues. This 
can then be modelled as a correlated equilibrium in the target game.  
         This experiment was constructed in the form of a series of matching games. 
The design of the experiment controlled for confounding factors and isolated analogy 
in very simple games. However it was shown that analogy worked in more 
complicated situations where there was more than one potential analogue. Although 
there is evidence that analogy was used to a lesser extent in the latter case this 
suggests that, given more opportunity for the players to settle on one analogue, the 
incidence of analogy use could have been higher. The high level of use of the 
opposing player’s previous base game play suggests that part of the problem was that 
the players were trying to coordinate as well as use analogies and the existence of two 
analogies caused confusion. 
  This experiment and its results link in very closely with previous 
experiments and also the various theories of matching. Indeed this experiment shows 
that there is no real contradiction between the various theories of matching put 
forward, especially that of Casajus, and the theory of analogy. It seems that analogy 
can therefore be accommodated simply as a different type of salience within matching 
games. However Kreps (1990) and other authors seem to believe that analogy can be 
applied in a far wider set of circumstances than simply in matching games. If they are 
right then there is a need for further experiments in analogy to find out how it works. 
The idea of analogy as a form of mapping which creates a correlating device in a 
correlated equilibrium is a good starting point for experiments on non- matching 
games.
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Appendix 1: Figure 1 
 
You are paired with the same person in this room as you were paired with for the last 
two games. Ring ONE of the rectangles below. If both you and your partner ring the 
same rectangle then you will get £4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have ringed one of the rectangles please wait for the experimenter to come 
around. 
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                            Appendix 2: Figure 2 
 
You have been paired with one other person in this room who you will be playing 
with throughout this session. Ring ONE of the rectangles below. If both you and your 
partner ring the same rectangle then you will get £4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have ringed one of the rectangles please wait for the experimenter to come 
around. 
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You are paired with the same person in this room as you were paired with in the last 
game. Ring ONE of the rectangles below. If both you and your partner ring the same 
rectangle then you will get £4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have ringed one of the rectangles please wait for the experimenter to come 
around. 
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